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INTRODUCTION 
In the Opinion of the Court filed July 11, 1996, (the 
"Opinion") the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment was upheld 
due to Plaintiff's failure to satisfy the requirements of the 
"discovery rule". In reviewing the Opinion, it appears that the 
Court overlooked an alternative tolling theory argued by 
Plaintiff arising under Section 327 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts. The equitable tolling theory contemplated by the 
Restatement has unique application to the present case due to the 
rare standing of the beneficiary of a trust (Plaintiff) to pursue 
claims against a third party (Defendants) who knowingly 
participated with the Trustee in a breach of trust. Under these 
circumstances, the principles governing limitations are greatly 
relaxed and do not impose duties on the Plaintiff similar to 
those required by the discovery rule. When analyzed under the 
Restatement standard, Plaintiff's claims survive Defendants' 
challenge on the basis of limitations. At the oral argument of 
this appeal, Plaintiff's counsel primarily relied on the 
Restatement approach. In order to assist the Court in ruling on 
this Petition, a certified transcript of the oral argument is 
included within the Addendum hereto. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendants' Knowing Participation in the Breach of Trust. 
1. Defendants' activities and involvement with the Trustee 
in breaching the terms of the subject trust are well documented 
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in Plaintiff's Brief and Reply Brief at pages 7-14 and 2-8, 
respectively. Upon examining the Court's Opinion in this matter, 
it does not appear that the Court questions Defendants' 
involvement and participation in the breach of trust. 
Consequently, for purposes of brevity, Plaintiff will not, here, 
restate the facts relevant to establishing Defendants' 
participation in the breach but will instead refer the Court to 
the pages of her Briefs as referenced above. 
Plaintiff's Knowledge of the Breach of Trust, 
2. The Trustee never told Plaintiff that he was 
appropriating money from trusts established for her benefit nor 
did he discuss the concept of borrowing on margin with her. In 
fact, Plaintiff did not know what "margin" was and the Trustee 
had never mentioned that word to her. (Rec. 1454) . 
3. Plaintiff believed that her son was affluent and able to 
afford the lifestyle he enjoyed because of his independent 
investments in stock, property and businesses he had developed 
and worked with. (Rec. 1455). 
4. Statements for the Norman Anderson Trust, the James N. 
Anderson personal account and Anna Lee Anderson Trusts were sent 
to the Trustee, James N. Anderson, and not Plaintiff. (Rec. 
1489) . 
5. In explaining that all of the Levi stock had been lost, 
the Trustee told Plaintiff that the stock had been lost due to a 
"market crash." (Rec. 1459). 
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6. Defendant Pahnke also attributed the losses in the 
account to market conditions. (Rec. 1462). 
7. The Trustee never told Plaintiff that he had transferred 
stock out of the Norman Anderson Trust in violation of the trust 
agreement. (Rec. 1459). 
8. In explaining the loss of the Levi stock, the Trustee 
gave Plaintiff no indication and/or reason to believe that the 
losses were the fault of Dean Witter and/or himself. (Rec. 
1459). 
9. Plaintiff did not discover that the assets had been 
wrongfully transferred out of the Norman Anderson Trust account 
or that the assets were wrongfully margined until December, 1990, 
while being prepared to testify as a witness in an arbitration 
hearing involving the Trustee and Defendants Dean Witter and 
Pahnke. (Rec. 1040, 1136-37). 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff presented and argued two independent legal 
theories pursuant to which her claims would be preserved under 
applicable statutes of limitation, to wit: the discovery rule 
and Section 327 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. In its 
Opinion, the Court addressed the applicability of the discovery 
rule concluding that it did not apply because Plaintiff had 
failed to make adequate inquiry. However, the Court failed to 
consider Plaintiff's arguments under the Restatement provision 
and thus overlooked governing law which would otherwise preserve 
Plaintiff's suit. 
Under Section 327, the beneficiary has no duty of inquiry, 
and is barred by laches only if she delays in bringing her claims 
once she has learned of the actual breach of trust. Under this 
standard, Plaintiff's claims necessarily survive. There is no 
evidence that Plaintiff had specific knowledge of the breach 
prior to December 1990, the time the Complaint was filed. At the 
very least, triable issues of fact exists as to when Plaintiff 
"knew" of the breach of trust in question. Consequently, the 
trial court's summary judgment ruling should be reversed. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE PRESERVED UNDER SECTION 327 OF THE 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS. 
The law governing Plaintiff's claims, within the context of 
the statute of limitations, is set forth in §327 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (hereinafter "Section 327"). 
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Section 327 allows a beneficiary to bring claims against a third 
party for breach of trust after the applicable statute of 
limitations has expired if two requirements can be satisfied. 
Those requirements are set forth in Section 327 which provides in 
relevant part: 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a breach 
of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from 
maintaining an action against him therefore, unless: 
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §327(2) (a) . Thus, in order for 
Section 327 to apply, a third person must have knowingly 
participated in a breach of trust, and the beneficiary must not 
be guilty of laches in bringing the claim for breach of trust. 
The comment on Section 327(2) sets forth the standard for 
determining if a beneficiary is guilty of laches: 
If a third person knowingly participates in the breach of 
trust, the beneficiary is not barred from maintaining a suit 
against him merely because the trustee is barred. The 
beneficiary will be barred if, but only if, he is himself 
guilty of laches. Thus, the beneficiary will not be barred 
if he is under an incapacity or ordinarily if he did not 
know of the breach of trust. 
Id, at 127-128 (emphasis added). Section 327 imposes no duty of 
inquiry and the beneficiary is not guilty of laches as long as 
she did not know of the breach of trust. In the present case, 
there is absolutely no evidence that Plaintiff knew of the breach 
of trust prior to December, 1990, the time the Complaint was 
filed. Consequently, she is not guilty of laches, and her claims 
survive the statute of limitations. 
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Plaintiff established both requirements under Section 327, 
to wit: the knowing participation of the Defendants in the 
breach of trust and the diligent and timely pursuit of her claims 
once she learned of the breach. At the very least, there exist 
triable issues of material fact with respect to each requirement, 
which precludes the entry of summary judgment in this matter. 
A. Defendants Knowingly Participated With the Trustee 
in a Breach of Trust, 
Defendants knowingly participated with the Trustee in the 
breach of trust. Defendants had secured a complete copy of the 
trust instrument from the Trustee. (Rec. 1036; 1048-49) . 
Defendant Pahnke handwrote the Letter of Authorization on Dean 
Witter letterhead transferring all of the assets out of the Trust 
in violation of the Trust Agreement. (Rec. 1039; 1096-97; 1099) . 
The assets were transferred into margin accounts in violation of 
Dean Witter policy and the common law1 after the Regional 
Operations Center of Dean Witter had informed the Salt Lake City 
branch that the Norman Anderson Trust Account could be 
administered on a cash account basis only. (Rec. 1038; 1085-87 
and 1123). To deny a knowing participation in the breach of 
trust by Defendants requires the undisputed facts in this 
proceeding to be ignored. Consequently, the first requirement of 
1
 See, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 
F.Supp. 373 (S.D. Texas 1965); In re Shaner Estate, 26 D&C 2d 450 
(Pa. 1961). See also, Scott, Trusts, §227.6 Vol. Ill, p. 444 
(1988); Loring, A Trustee1s Handbook, §55 at 156 (5th Ed. 1940). 
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Section 327 is satisfied. 
B. Plaintiff is Not Guilty of Laches, 
Plaintiff has met the requirements of the second prong of 
Section 327 as well, in establishing her timely pursuit of this 
action upon learning of the breach of trust in question. Within 
several days of discovering the breach of trust, Plaintiff 
immediately caused the Complaint in the present action to be 
filed. There is no evidence to the contrary. Under Section 327 
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a beneficiary is not 
guilty of laches and her claims against a third party for 
participating in a breach of trust are not time barred unless she 
delayed in bringing the suit after she knew of the breach of 
trust. See, Comment to Section 327(2) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts. This standard differs from the "discovery 
rule" which requires the plaintiff to make inquiry once she is on 
"notice" of the facts giving rise to her cause of action. 
Section 327, by contrast, imposes no duty of inquiry on the 
beneficiary. Instead, the beneficiary's claims are preserved 
until such time as she literally knows of the breach of trust. 
In addition, the mere passage of time is not enough to 
invoke the doctrine of laches. See, Gillespie v. Seymour, 823 
P.2d 782 (Kan. 1991) (failure of co-trustee to bring action 
arising out of alleged misapplication of trust's oil and gas 
investment could not be utilized to bar, under doctrine of 
laches, beneficiaries from bringing action; beneficiaries moved 
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promptly to bring action upon learning of the facts); Matter of 
Trust Created by Belcrard v. Johnson, 829 P.2d 457 (Colo.App. 
1991) (remainderman's cause of action for breach of trust accrued 
when breach of trust was discovered); Skok v. Snyder, 733 P.2d 
547 (Wash.App. 1987) (in order to set statute of limitations in 
motion against beneficiary, trustee's repudiation of express 
trust must be plain, strong and unequivocal; repudiation may be 
by words or by the conduct by which trustee denies trust and 
claims property as his own, but such action must be open and, to 
be effective, must be brought home to beneficiary). 
In the present case, Plaintiff did not know of the breach of 
trust until December 1990 and filed her Complaint immediately 
thereafter. Defendants have not adduced any evidence that would 
support a finding that Plaintiff knew, prior to 1990, that there 
had been a repudiation of the trust, or, equally important, that 
Defendants had participated therein. To the contrary, Plaintiff 
was always led to believe that the losses sustained were nothing 
more than the result of a market crash and were not attributable 
to any impropriety on the part of the Trustee or any third person 
dealing with the Trustee. It was not until December, 1990, that 
the discovery of the actual breach was made. Neither limitations 
nor laches may bar recovery. 
In addition, the defense of laches is dependent upon two 
elements, to wit: lack of diligence on the part of the Plaintiff 
and injury to Defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Plateau 
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Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 731 
(Utah 1990) . See also: Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 
1980). Defendants' claims of injury are certainly not 
dispositive. All documents directly relevant to this dispute 
have been discovered. The claims of "faded memories" or 
inability to locate what are, at best, documents which are 
peripheral to this dispute, have never been tied to a legitimate 
theory of defense. To the contrary, the witnesses and parties 
who were directly involved with the tortious conduct have had no 
failure of memory and all documents central to these claims have 
been retrieved. 
Finally, this Court concluded that Plaintiff failed in her 
duty to inquire into the facts surrounding the loss of the trust 
funds as required under the discovery rule. The Court indicates 
that if Plaintiff had made such an inquiry, she would have 
discovered the breach of trust. Inferable from the Court's 
Opinion is the fact that Plaintiff did not know a breach of trust 
had taken place when she was informed of the loss of the stock in 
1984. 
Assuming that Plaintiff was aware of facts in 1984 that may 
have led her to the discovery of a breach of trust, it is 
important to note that those facts alone were insufficient to 
confer knowledge of a breach. Under Section 327, the 
beneficiary's claims are preserved until such time as she 
actually knows of the breach of trust. 
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In the present case, Plaintiff learned of the breach of 
trust in December 1990 and filed her Complaint within days 
thereafter. She is thus not guilty of laches. At the very 
least, triable issues of fact exist with respect to when 
Plaintiff knew of the breach of trust. Accordingly, the second 
requirement of Section 327 has also been satisfied and 
Plaintiff's claims survive the challenge of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff responded to Defendants' limitations claims under 
two separate legal theories calculated to toll the limitations 
period. The Court examined the "discovery rule" theory and found 
it to be inapplicable to the present case. Plaintiff believes 
the Court inadvertently overlooked the application of Section 327 
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts when evaluating Defendants' 
limitations arguments and respectfully requests the Court to 
rehear this matter for that purpose. The requirements imposed by 
Section 327 have been satisfied, in their entirety, and 
Plaintiff's claims are independently preserved thereunder. At 
the very least, triable issues of fact exist with regard to 
Plaintiff having met the requirements of Section 327, thereby 
precluding a grant of summary judgment in this matter. 
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Z3TA DATED this -^frr3 day of July, 1996. 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
O-rt irr 
MORTON, 
y for Plaintiff 
ant 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 1996 
2 -OOOOO-
3 THE COURT: Let's have counsel come forward on 
4 Anderson v. Dean Witter, Reynolds, 
5 Gentlemen, if we could have you identify 
6 I yourselves orally for the record. 
MR. MORTON: James Morton appearing on behalf of 
8 i Anna Lee Anderson. 
9 I THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Morton. 
MR. PALMER: Joe Palmer appearing for defendants, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Morton, you have 15 minutes to 
use. Would you like to reserve some time? 
MR. MORTON: I believe I'll reserve five minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll try and help keep 
track of it. We're prepared to begin when you are. 
17 MR. MORTON: Thank you. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
May it please the Court and Mr. Palmer: This is 
an appeal from a final order granting summary judgment. 
The basis for the trial court's ruling was threefold: 
First, that plaintiff did not have standing to bring a 
suit; second, that defendants did not have actual knowledge 
of a breach of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement; and, 
third, that plaintiff's claims are barred by applicable 
statutes of limitation. 
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1 It's our contention that triable issues of fact 
2 exist under each of those categories and that the Court's 
3 ruling was improvident for that reason. 
4 THE COURT: With respect to the first issue, why 
5 isn't your argument that the law of the case, right or 
6 wrong, in this case was fixed by the prior panel that heard 
7 this matter and found, in no uncertain terms, that 
8 Ms. Anderson had at least a right, as a beneficiary, to 
g J bring her action? I read the opinion just this morning and 
it seems to have said that and — 
MR. MORTON: Exactly. 
THE COURT: — not much more and not much less. 
MR. MORTON: Perhaps in my brief I didn't state 
it quite as eloquently as that, but, essentially, that is 
what we've argued, that the standing issues has been 
decided, that this Court determined in a 1992 decision that 
Ms. Anderson could show, at the very least, that the 
trustee neglected to initiate this action by having waited 
more than ten years. 
In addition, the Court suggested that the — the 
fact that there was a hostility in the interest between the 
trustee and the beneficiary was sufficient. I believe 
Mr. Palmer has suggested that that hostility somehow has to 
be personal hostility, which is not the case. And, 
clearly, there's hostility here between the trustee and the 
beneficiary. 
Our contention is that the trustee looted this 
trust with the assistance of Dean Witter, and so the 
standing issue, it's our contention, has been resolved. 
THE COURT: But for being the trustee's son, the 
trustee had been sued as well. 
MR. PALMER: I think — I mean, not for being the 
beneficiary's son — 
MR. MORTON: The trustee is a beneficiary's son 
and I believe that's an accurate statement in part, and the 
trustee is broke as well, which was a practical side to the 
whole thing. 
In dealing with the knowledge and limitations 
issues, I believe those two issues are intertwined, for 
reasons I'll get to. On the actual knowledge issue, this 
case is teeming with genuine issues of material fact. 
Consider this, if you will: That defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter knew that the assets of the Norman 
Anderson Trust were required to be distributed into two 
subordinate trusts, known as the marital and the family 
trusts. Nevertheless, the assets of the Norman Anderson 
Trust were transferred into unrelated margin accounts that 
were under different names. 
Dean Witter's expert says that to name a trust 
account in a name — oh, I'm sorry. 
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1 THE COURT: Excuse me. Do you allege that there 
2 were any margin account transactions in the account prior 
3 to the distribution to the two — 
4 MR. MORTON: There were. In fact, that's an 
5 issue that I'll get to, but there were some $70,000 in 
6 | margin borrowing that occurred prior to this transfer. 
7 I Subsequent to Norman Anderson's death, a margin agreement 
8 was signed, margin borrowing took place. In fact, margin 
borrowing took place to buy a new Mercedes for the trustee, 
all with Mr. Pahnke's knowledge. 
At some point in time, the compliance department 
at Dean Witter requested a copy of the trust agreement to 
be reviewed, and Dean Witter says, "We don't know why." 
But it was subsequent to those transfers — or, I'm sorry, 
subsequent to that margin business being conducted prior to 
the transfers into these other accounts. 
And it's our contention that the transfers were 
made to try and legitimize the margin borrowing that was 
already illegitimate. 
Dean Witter and Mr. Pahnke knew that the assets 
of the Norman Anderson Trust could not be margin without an 
amendment of the trust agreement that was signed by the 
trustor. And the trustor was dead, so, obviously, that 
could never have happened. 
They knew that a complete copy of the trust 
9 
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agreement had to be obtained prior to establishing an 
account on behalf of the trust. And you have to understand 
that even though these transfers occurred in two unrelated 
trust accounts, including the personal account of the 
trustee, Mr. Pahnke contends that the transfers were 
actually to the, quote, "marital trust and the family 
trust.11 And he identified them as such in his letter of 
authorization that he handwrote. 
Those accounts were never named or titled under 
the marital trust and family trust. But assuming that he 
knew that these were trusts, again all of the procedural 
mechanisms broke down. There was no procurement of the 
trust agreement, there was no determination of the powers 
of the trustee to determine whether he could margin the 
assets in the trust. And, of course, margin call is what 
caused the losses in these accounts. 
The Norman Anderson Trust had been approved for 
cash business only. Nevertheless, it was margined and its 
assets were allowed to be margined, and there's also an 
industry standard that indicates if trust assets are 
transferred into a margin account and those margin accounts 
are also trust accounts, that there needs to be an 
independent review to determine whether in fact those 
accounts are eligible for margin business. 
THE COURT: Help me understand, sir, what the 
7 
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1 disputed issues of material facts are. I understand your 
2 argument. 
3 MR. MORTON: I'd like to know the same thing. I 
4 | don't understand how Judge Frederick ever reached a 
determination that there were no issues of material fact 
here. The issues that I've just articulated I don't 
7 I believe are disputed in any way, shape or form. Mr. Pahnke 
8 says, "I understood these were trust agreements, that were 
the receiving accounts here. I just took Mr. Anderson's 
word for it that he was a trustee. I understood that there 
were policies governing margin borrowing that were 
circumvented here." 
It was simply inappropriate for the trial court 
to have granted summary judgment. 
THE COURT: So your argument isn't that there 
were contested issues. You're arguing that there were — 
17 MR. MORTON: T h a t ' s r i g h t . 
THE COURT: — uncontested issues and you got the 
wrong answer. 
MR. MORTON: I actually filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, which was denied, which I haven't 
appealed. But it was our contention that there were no 
issues of fact on those very subjects. 
24 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
25 MR. MORTON: Assuming that actual knowledge is 
18 
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1 established, the next issue becomes limitations, and there 
2 are special rules that apply for a beneficiary in a case 
3 like this. Assuming that a third party knowingly assisted 
4 the trustee in a breach of trust, Section 3 27 of the 
5 restatement governs, and that holds the beneficiary to a 
6 different standard than the trustee. The same time 
7 limitations that govern the trustee don't govern the 
8 beneficiary. 
9 And, in fact, the beneficiary is not required to 
bring suit until she has facts sufficient to understand 
that there has been a breach of trust. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you about that, 
because it seems to me that, probably, if you scrape away a 
lot of the discussion essence, Judge Frederick's decision 
was that no matter how you slice and dice the rest of it, 
this claim was just brought too late. And that even under 
the discovery rule, she knew a zillion years ago about the 
fact that her stuff was gone. And but for the family 
relationship, a zillion years ago she'd have brought her 
action against the trustee, who clearly had looted a fund 
in which she had a beneficial interest. 
Now, it may well be that in the course of 
discovery in that lawsuit she would have discovered that 
there was some culpability on the part of third parties and 
so forth. What is it, in your view, that has to be 
1 discovered by the beneficiary; the fact of loss, which 
2 happened a zillion years ago, or the actual theory that can 
3 be asserted against parties other than the trustee? 
4 Because I gather there's almost a decade's worth of 
5 difference between — or six years worth of difference 
6 between those two events, 
7 MR. MORTON: There is six years worth of 
8 difference. The difference under Section 327 of the 
restatement is that the beneficiary needs to understand 
that there's been a breach of trust, not a loss. And 
what's also important to understand is that there's some 
act of concealment that went on in this case. That 
concealment involves telling a half-truth. 
Anna Lee Anderson was told by her son, the 
trustee, that these losses were, while unfortunate, 
legitimately sustained, that "I had these accounts on 
17 I margin, I was authorized to do that, and the market went 
18 I down and there were margin calls, which resulted in the 
losses." 
THE COURT: Which part of that is untrue? 
MR. MORTON: That's — the fact that the trustee 
22 I was authorized, 
23 i THE COURT: Is there any other part of that 
24 that' s untrue? 
25 J MR. MORTON: No. Otherwise, it's correct, 
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1 I But the fact that — but implicit in the 
2 trustee's charge that he was authorized to margin the funds 
3 lulled her into, for lack of a better term, a false sense 
4 of security. She believed that these were legitimate 
5 losses and there was nothing she could do about it. And it 
6 wasn't until December of 1990 that she discovered that in 
7 fact — and, believe me, there have been legions of 
attorneys, accountants that have looked at this stuff. But 
without having seen the letter of authorization, which is 
attached as Exhibit A to our original brief, no one could 
put the puzzle together. No one ever had a clue that Jim 
Anderson did not have the authority to margin these 
accounts and that they were in fact not his to deal with as 
he saw fit. 
In addition, there's other evidence that suggests 
that Mr. Pahnke was more than an aider and abettor here. I 
mean, Mr. Pahnke made more off of these accounts than he 
has any other customer in his career. Dean Witter made 
over a million dollars in margin interest off of these 
accounts. 
And Mr. Pahnke did some incredibly dishonest 
things. He wrote letters to lenders of the trustee telling 
them that these assets belonged to the trustee personally. 
He forged account documents. He did all kinds of things 
that were clearly outside the bounds of propriety for 
11 
1 someone in his profession. They violated industry 
2 standards, they violated Dean Witter's internal standards 
3 and, as a result, enabled the trustee to do something that 
4 he was not otherwise permitted to do under the trust. 
5 I THE COURT: Let me ask you about just that last 
6 | statement. You said that it was necessary to find a 
7 I handwritten letter to put the puzzle together; without that 
8 document, it would not have been clear, that the fact that 
g the trustee was without authorization to deal in margin 
accounts and so forth. I would think that just looking at 
the trust agreement would lead to that result. 
My understanding of part of the argument was that 
unless — or at least industry views on the subject are 
that unless there is specific authority given to a trustee, 
mere authority to deal with securities and so forth is not 
taken to give the trustee authority to deal with margin 
accounts and futures commodities and other somewhat more 
speculative things. 
Isn't it true that a simple reading of this trust 
agreement would show that the trustee lacked the authority 
to deal with margin accounts? 
MR. MORTON: I think that's partially true, but 
you have to understand the improper transfer that occurred 
in April of 1980 to figure out how the funds that were 
supposed to go into the marital and family trusts were 
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routed into these independent accounts and the other margin 
2 I accounts. 
3 The reason the water gets murky here is because 
4 | Norman Anderson had gifted stock and assets to his son, Jim 
5 I Anderson, prior to his death. Anna Lee Anderson had every 
6 | reason to believe that he had his own nest egg as well and 
7 I that he had the right to control and manage his own 
8 , accounts, 
g I All she knew — she wasn't getting account 
statements. She wasn't getting any accurate information 
from the trustee and, month in and month out, she didn't 
know if accounts were established in the name of the 
marital and family trusts or something else. She certainly 
didn't know that there were named accounts that were 
supposed to be the marital and family trusts but that were 
actually denominated as other accounts. 
I've used more time than I was supposed to. 
THE COURT: We'll give you a couple of minutes on 
rebuttal if you have some questions. 
Mr. Palmer? 
MR. PALMER: Excuse me. I have a c o l d . 
THE COURT: D o n ' t we a l l ? 
MR. MORTON: Yeah. D o n ' t we a l l . 
MR. PALMER: May i t p l e a s e t h e C o u r t and 
Mr. Mor ton : I n t h i s c a s e , t h i s i s a c l e a n c a s e . The re 
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are no genuine issues of fact. The parties are not in 
dispute about what happened. There is quite a bit of 
difference, in my view, and quite a recital of what the 
record says and particularly as to what the experts that we 
called said. And I urge careful reading of the record. 
But there are no conflicts of fact along the lines of "Yes 
you did; no you didn't." 
Likewise, there are no witnesses from plaintiff's 
side, no affidavits to establish any standards of practice 
in the industry, not a single witness for plaintiff ever 
testified that we breached any standard or that we did 
anything wrong. All there is is plaintiff's counsel's 
argument. 
Now, it's important to understand that by the 
letter of April — or by the letter of authorization in 
April of 1980, these accounts were correctly transferred. 
The letter of authorization mentions the two trusts, the 
family trust and the marital trust, but it directs them 
into specific existing accounts. 
THE COURT: Well, they continued to be held in 
the trust in accordance with the terms of those trust 
documents, but — 
MR. PALMER: No, sir. 
THE COURT: — they were kept in another account. 
MR. PALMER: No, sir. They were directed into 
14 
1 specific existing accounts, 
2 THE COURT: As a distribution out of the trust. 
3 MR. PALMER: It matters not. One was directed 
4 by — into the Anna Lee Anderson Trust Account, an existing 
5 margin account, and the other was directed into James 
6 Anderson's personal account. It matters not that they were 
7 designated — that it was indicated that they were coming 
8 out of the Norman Anderson Trust or that they were family 
trust or whatever. 
The reason that that's — well, first of all, I 
need to make it clear that Jim Anderson, the trustee, 
directed into these two specific accounts and he did not 
intend them to be directed into the family trust — into a 
non-existent family trust account. He didn't intend to 
establish a family trust account. He knew how these 
accounts were directed to be transferred. He never 
objected to the way they were transferred. He went on for 
ten years and left them there. 
Had he expected them to go into a family trust 
account or a marital trust account, he needed to say so. 
THE COURT: Mr. Palmer. 
MR. PALMER: Ma'am. 
THE COURT: Doesn't that transfer violate the 
terms of the Norman Anderson Trust for distribution? 
15 
THE COURT: Or not? 
2 I MR. PALMER: The point I wanted — the next point 
3 I wanted to make is that having done exactly as he 
4 I directed, that the — that it isn't a question of violation 
5 of the trust account. There is — the experts of the 
6 | Norman Anderson Trust, the experts that we called explained 
7 I that one couldn't necessarily tell whether or not it 
8 , violated the trust agreement. Dean Spurgeon so testified 
9 
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and explained on his deposition. 
But the point is that it is the trustee's duty 
and obligation to decide when and how accounts are to be — 
trust accounts are to be distributed. All trust accounts 
have distributees, often the distributee is the trustee 
himself. It is not the job of Dean Witter or Pahnke to 
analyze the trust document to find out whether or not it 
._ , breaches the trust, 
ID 
17 I Absent actual knowledge, according to the 
statute — absent actual knowledge, that is a knowledge of 
what the trust document says about distribution and actual 
conclusion that that breaches the trust, absent that actual 
knowledge, it is our duty to follow exactly and precisely 
and properly the directions of the trustee. 
If he wants to direct it into his own name, we're 
bound to do it. Now — 
THE COURT: Is it completely irrelevant that Dean 
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1 Witter's own authorization was only for cash accounts? 
2 MR. PALMER: The second part of the initial point 
3 that I was making, which is that these accounts were 
4 transferred into the two existing accounts, that Jim, the 
5 trustee, intended and directed his own personal account and 
6 the Anna Lee Anderson account, those were margin accounts. 
THE COURT: What about the transaction — 7 
8 MR. PALMER: And he c o u l d do a n y t h i n g t h a t he 
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wished in transferring those accounts to the new accounts 
and having been transferred into existing margin accounts, 
it is not our job to determine whether or not itfs all 
right to margin in those accounts. They were new owners, 
they owned the accounts, they could do whatever they wanted 
with them. 
Ma'am, I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: That's all right. 
What about the transactions that occurred before 
the distribution? Mr. Morton has said that there were 
margin transactions, and that would have violated the trust 
and the — as I understand it, the designation of that 
account is a cash-only account. 
MR. PALMER: There were two loans made before the 
April 1980 letter of authorization, one for thirty thousand 
and one for $40,000 out of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Account. The Norman Anderson Trust Account trust document 
17 
1 did not say that margining was permitted. 
2 It does not follow at all that the trustee could 
3 not borrow out of those accounts. It was Dean Witter1s 
4 policy, initial policy, to ask that the — to see or for an 
5 conveyance to a trust document to say that margining is 
6 permitted. But that doesn't mean that borrowing or 
7 margining could not be done out of those two accounts, 
o The state statutes specifically give the trustee 
g power to borrow and to encumber assets. And the experts 
that we called, all three of them, two of them from the 
brokerage industry and Dean Spurgeon from the viewpoint of 
an investor and knowledgeable about trust procedures, all 
three of them said that borrowing still would have been 
permissible out of this trust and not a violation of a law. 
Notwithstanding that the document wasn't amended to provide 
16 • f ° r l t ' 
17 I The trust document specifically said the trustee 
has all the powers given under the uniform — Utah Uniform 
Trustees Powers Act. That includes the power to borrow and 
to encumber. 
THE COURT: So your view would be that it's 
neither here nor there that it might have been at odds with 
some Dean Witter internal policy that was in effect at the 
24 . t ime. 
2 5 I MR. PALMER: A b s o l u t e l y . 
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1 I THE COURT: The question here is whether or not 
2 it violated statutory or common law principles under the 
3 fiduciary of third parties fall to the beneficiaries. 
4 MR. PALMER: Right. Now, as to your question, 
5 Justice Owen, about standing, I think it is crystal clear 
6 that the prior opinion of this case was that, based upon 
7 the complaint that was alleged, which the district court 
had dismissed for failure to state a claim, this court said 
that plaintiff should be given the opportunity to prove 
facts showing she has standing. And she didn't. She did 
not prove the requisite hostility of interest between Jim 
and the beneficiary. 
And while we're talking about the standing issue, 
there are two parts to the standing issue. One is the 
requirement of hostility. And the other is the requirement 
that the trustee be joined in the lawsuit. The restatement 
makes that perfectly clear. 
Under the restatement, a beneficiary has no cause 
of action whatever for a tort of — for an action in law. 
That action belongs solely to the trustee. 
There are cases that say and those that are 
recited in this court's prior opinion. All involve a case 
where the beneficiary sues the trustee and the third party. 
There is only one case, the Abbey Moto case, which is in 
this court's prior opinion, where the trustee — excuse me, 
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1 where the beneficiary sued the third party directly without 
2 joining the trustee. And guess what happened in that case? 
3 The Michigan court dismissed it for failure to join the 
4 trustee. 
5 Why is this important that the trustee be in the 
6 | lawsuit in order for the beneficiary to have standing? It 
7 i is because the trustee is the owner of the rights and 
8 assets of the trust. When he's — when a third party is 
g J sued, if he loses, he has got to pay the trustee not the 
beneficiary. If he were to pay the beneficiary, he would 
still be exposed to the trustee. He'd be paying twice. 
The law requires that the suit be brought by the 
trustee not by the beneficiary. The beneficiary's only 
remedy is a suit in equity, joining the trustee to compel 
the trustee to bring his cause of action against the third 
party. And to avoid duplicity of suits, the beneficiary 
may join the third party in the suit against the trustee. 
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and essential part of standing. And, likewise, in order 
for the beneficiary to have that claim, he must prove the 
hostility of interest. 
Now, what does the hostility of interest mean? 
It means that the trustee knowingly, because of what he's 
done, won't sue. And that's why the beneficiary gets to 
sue in his stead, to compel the trustee to sue. 
20 
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1 I Well, that isn't this case. All of the evidence 
2 I is that Jim didn't know that hefd done anything wrong. All 
3 of the evidence is that the professionals that he hired: 
4 I three accountants, two lawyers, which, when you submit page 
46 of their brief, they admit that they had all the monthly 
6 I statements, the trust documents for all three accounts. 
7 And they knew exactly what had happened in April of 1980. 
And none of them ever raised any question about the 
propriety of this transfer in 1980. 
Now, have in mind on the merits of this claim not 
only does the record not establish actual knowledge by Dean 
Witter, you never even get to the margining issue that they 
want to talk about until you find that these conveyances in 
April of '80 have to be set aside, because the transfers 
were — excuse me — the transferees could do exactly what 
they wanted with those accounts, including margin 
borrowing. 
And you don't even reach the issue of whether or 
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ig not the Norman Anderson Trust Document permitted margin 
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borrowing by these two distributees. The distributees, 
Anna Lee Anderson Trust and Jim Anderson, could do whatever 
they wished with those accounts and the assets in them, the 
assets having been transferred to them. 
On the limitations issue, that is really simple. 
And Justice Owen, you hit it. Not only did she know in May 
21 
1 of 1984 that all the stock had been lost to pay the debts, 
2 she knew back in 1980 and in 1984 that that stock was 
3 untouchable. It was her nest egg. She testified at length 
4 that those assets should never have been touched in the 
5 Norman Anderson account. So she knew in 198 0 not only that 
6 they were gone but they shouldn't have been gone. They 
7 should never have been touched at all, she said. "That was 
8 my untouchable nest egg." 
9 THE COURT: You're going to have to bring it to a 
close, Mr. Palmer. 
MR. PALMER: And I appreciate the Court's 
questioning. If there are no other questions, I'll leave. 
Thank you. 
u I THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Morton, we'll give you a couple of minutes. 
MR. MORTON: I'll talk very fast. 
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MR. MORTON: I ' l l t r y . 
First of all, this letter of authorization was a 
subterfuge. And I can say, in no uncertain terms, this is 
what creates the ultimate issue of fact in this case. It's 
attached as Exhibit A, it's our addendum to the initial 
brief. 
Jim Anderson called Mr. Pahnke and said, "I want 
to buy a house." And he'd already borrowed $70,000 out of 
22 
1 the Norman Anderson Trust to buy a Mercedes, 
2 Mr. Pahnke got nervous and said, "You've got to 
3 come in and sign a document." 
4 The testimony is in the case that when 
5 Mr. Anderson arrived at Mr. Pahnke's office, this document 
6 | was waiting for him to sign. It refers to the marital 
7 I trust, to the family trust; certainly, Mr. Pahnke had 
8 actual knowledge of the distribution scheme of the Norman 
Anderson Trust or he could not have created this document. 9 
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Now, Mr. Pahnke's spin that he puts on this is 
that, "I was just a scribe. I just wrote as Mr. Anderson 
dictated." It's entirely in Mr. Pahnke's handwriting, it's 
on Dean Witter stationery. But the interesting thing is 
the vernacular that's used in this letter. 
Instead of saying "transferring shares," it 
refers to "journaling shares." I mean, it's an industry 
term. Instead of referring to a "margin account," it 
refers to a "Type 1" account. 
Mr. Anderson, who was a tennis pro, I dare say, 
was not familiar with those types of industry terms. They 
are clearly issues of fact on that subject. 
With respect to the suggestion that we did not 
put the affidavit of any expert into evidence, that's true, 
because we didn't need to. Their experts gave us great 
23 
answers to the questions. When we were going through and 
interrogating their experts about Dean Witter's policies 
and whether these policies are consistent with industry 
standards, without exception, they said "Yes." 
So each time that I asked if industry standards 
required that margin accounts be approved by the operation 
center of a brokerage prior to allowing margining, not only 
did the policy require it, but industry standards at large 
required it. This was not something that was unique to 
Dean Witter, it was not something that was just so 
internal, but the industry at large believed that this was 
a necessary principle in order to allow margining. 
And even when you read these policies — and I've 
got them all set forth in our brief — they're not just 
policies to control Dean Witter's internal operations. 
They say things like, "On advice of our legal department, 
if we don't do this, we may have to rescind the 
transaction." 
Clearly, they're thinking about liability, 
they're thinking about accountability to their customers 
when they impose these particular policies and procedures 
on their account executives. 
Mr. Palmer raises some new issues that I don't 
think have even been briefed with respect to the standing 
issue. I think the standing issue's been resolved by this 
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court. I don't think there's anything else that has to be 
established there. 
One last thing I want to say. I know I've gone 
over my two minutes. Just on this hostility issue. 
Mr. Palmer suggested there has to be some knowing 
participation on the part of the trustee. I ask you just 
to read the restatement. That's not what it says. That's 
torturing the language of the restatement to suggest that 
the trustee has to have knowledge. It's knowing 
participation of the third party accounts. 
Barring any questions, I'm done. Thank you very 
much. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Palmer. We appreciate 
your help and we'll (inaudible). 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
-ooOoo-
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